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Required reserves on banks’ deposit liabilities have been
utilized by both industrial and developing countries to
discourage and sterilize international capital flows. In this
paper, we utilize an open economy macro model incorporating
bank credit to evaluate this policy. The model suggests that
high levels of reserve requirements are a perverse policy tool 
in that they amplify the effects of foreign monetary shocks, 
but changes in reserve requirements can insulate a repressed
financial market from international financial shocks. 
The model also suggests that traditional measures of capital
mobility such as interest parity conditions or the scale of gross
private capital flows are of no value in assessing the openness of
repressed financial systems.
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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1997I. Introduction
The resurgence in private international capital flows to and from emerging markets
since 1989 has raised important questions for economic management. Liberalization
of both domestic financial markets and reduction in barriers to international capital
flows have called into question the compatibility of fixed, or highly managed,
exchange rates and independent monetary policies. For many developing countries,
the welfare implications of sequencing of reforms in domestic and international
financial markets has also been an important issue. 
The scale of private capital inflows to emerging markets in Asia and Latin
America has been similar, but the economic effects on the recipient countries have
not been nearly as uniform. In some cases, private capital inflows fueled consumption
and investment booms and had an immediate impact on real exchange rates, imports,
and the trade balance. The recent crisis in the Mexican financial system and the sharp
downturn in investment and economic growth have again focused attention on the
appropriate policy response to capital flows. 
It seems clear in retrospect that the “problems” associated with international capital
movements spring from the aggregate spending decisions financed by injections of
net foreign savings. Since domestic financial intermediaries often dominate the alloca-
tion of credit in emerging markets, a more careful evaluation of the economics of
financial intermediation in different countries might hold the key for understanding
the very different effects of capital flows. An interesting policy issue has been renewed
interest in direct controls over capital movements motivated in part by doubts about
the ability of domestic financial intermediaries to efficiently allocate net foreign savings.
Dooley, Frankel, and Mathieson (1987) conjectured that incomplete arbitrage
within national financial markets might account for the fact that nonfinancial devel-
opments in some countries appear to be insulated from international capital markets
even though domestic markets for a narrow class of financial assets are tied to similar
foreign markets through interest arbitrage: 
If by capital mobility one means the tendency of investors to equalize expected rates of
return on a subset of liquid, short-term, default-free assets denominated in different cur-
rencies or issued by residents of different countries, then there can be little doubt that
capital is mobile among the major industrial countries. This definition of capital
mobility, however, is of limited value. It is analogous to measuring the degree of inte-
gration of international goods markets by noting that prices (measured in a common
currency) are equalized for a subset of goods. There certainly are many agricultural
and mineral commodities for which this condition holds quite strictly. It is clear, how-
ever, that this condition tells us nothing about the tendency of prices of goods in general
to be equalized across countries. In fact, this more interesting purchasing-power-parity
measure of “goods mobility” has failed to hold in recent years. The key to this more
general condition is that within countries the relative prices of goods change by
substantial amounts and with no apparent tendency to return to their original levels.
More recently, Fry (1993) and Claassen (1993) have argued that poorly developed
and highly regulated domestic financial markets in some Asian developing countries
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develop a formal model for this conjecture and to begin to confront the data to see if
some countries in Asia might fit the model. 
The model developed below suggests that, in the presence of financial repression,
conventional tests of capital mobility do not measure the exposure of the economy to
shocks from international credit markets. In repressed systems, constraints on foreign
borrowing by nonfinancial firms, either because of regulatory, institutional barriers,
or information asymmetries, imply that the management of reserve requirements can
be “effective” in insulating the domestic economy from external financial shocks even
in cases where “large” private capital flows ensure that covered yields on domestic
bank deposit rates are equal to foreign interest rates. The assumption that drives 
the results is that nonbank residents are unable to bypass the domestic bank loan
market. The existence of such barriers, and their implications, is the empirical issue
we take up.
The model shows that, under plausible assumptions, reserve requirements are
“effective” in distorting domestic lending rates and spending decisions. The distor-
tion, however, is not the one that policy makers may have in mind. The interesting
result is that high fixed levels of reserve requirements magnify the effects of a change
in foreign interest rates both on the magnitude of private capital flows and on the
domestic interest rates most likely to influence spending decisions of residents. Thus,
high reserve requirements do not provide “insulation” from changes in international
interest rates.
1 Nevertheless, changes in the level of reserve requirements can com-
pletely insulate domestic spending decisions from the effects of changes in foreign
interest rates. This is the case even though the magnitude of private capital flows 
is further magnified by change in reserve ratios. In short, neither the traditional
measures of covered interest differentials nor the magnitude of private capital flows is
a useful measure of the sensitivity of the economy to foreign monetary shocks. In this
sense, the use of the terms “open” and “insulated” as antonyms is a tricky enterprise.
The economies we examine are clearly open to capital inflows; however, the
macroeconomic effects of these inflows can be muted by reserve policies, thus
illustrating the surprising results we obtain. 
II. Money and Credit Transmission Mechanisms
In this chapter, we explore the implications of distortions in domestic credit markets.
In a very broad sense, we are interested in the “degree of capital mobility” that links
the economies of emerging markets with the rest of the world. However, it is argued
below that the conventional tests of capital market integration may not be inform-
ative in evaluating economic interdependence among countries with very different
domestic financial markets. 
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1. It is sometimes argued that high reserve requirements provide liquidity to the domestic banking system in the
event of a capital outflow. Our model suggests that high reserve requirements magnify capital inflows and outflows
equally. The effect of changes in foreign interest rates on other important economic variables is independent of the
scale of gross capital flows.A. The Transmission Mechanism
The standard model that motivates econometric tests of interdependence is based on
a model of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy that emphasizes the
demand for and the supply of banks’ monetary liabilities. This emphasis appears to
be justified for industrial countries, but it is argued below that the institutional
arrangements that make this approach natural in industrial countries may be entirely
absent in some of the emerging markets that are of interest in this paper. For these
countries, a transmission mechanism that emphasizes the demand for and supply of
bank credit may be more useful in evaluating interdependence.
Frankel (1994) argues that the traditional model does offer a coherent explanation
for the ability of some countries to “sterilize” the effects of capital inflows on the
domestic money supply. Countries that sterilize successfully are defined as those in
which money demand and spending decisions are little affected by changes in short-
term interest rates. In the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, this is summarized by
inelastic IS and LM curves. It follows from this model that changes in foreign interest
rates will have limited influence on the central bank’s control of the domestic money
supply even if the domestic interest rate is tied to the foreign rate.
An obvious feature of this framework is that monetary policy is summarized by
the market-clearing conditions for money that depend, in turn, on a representative
interest-bearing financial asset. It is recognized that there are many interest rates 
in the economy, but differences in the term-to-maturity structure are easily explained
by the term structure in international markets, while differentials due to risk-
return trade-offs, taxes, and other institutional features may be substantial but are 
not sensitive to the policy tools available to the authorities. 
Our conjecture is that these are valid assumptions for the industrial countries, and
for developing countries in which domestic banks are easily bypassed through capital
flight and the activities of nonbank financial intermediaries. In these financial
markets, integration of the market for short-term traded assets such as bank deposits
or government securities is sufficient to ensure that, with fixed exchange rates,
monetary policy actions in industrial countries are quickly transmitted to all im-
portant financial markets, and in turn, to goods markets. Moreover, the institutional
structure of domestic financial markets in these countries suggests that the trans-
mission mechanism for monetary policy involves the demand for banks’ monetary
liabilities and the opportunity cost of holding money. Not surprisingly, this is the
transmission mechanism modeled in the standard Mundell-Fleming framework.
For emerging markets with much less developed domestic financial markets, but
markets that residents cannot easily bypass, this might be an incomplete model for
the transmission mechanism. We argue below that institutional arrangements in
several developing countries in Asia strongly favor the credit view of the transmission
mechanism. In turn, this suggests that integration of a traded security market such 
as bank deposits or treasury bills may not imply that foreign monetary policy is
transmitted to other financial markets that influence goods markets in these
countries. Capital controls might fail to isolate domestic bank deposit markets, 
but shocks to this “traded asset” market may not be transmitted to other domestic
financial and goods markets.
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evaluate the “credit view” of the monetary transmission mechanism in industrial
countries. This literature stresses asymmetric information about borrowers, and, in
some models, about financial institutions, as a source of credit market imperfections.
2
Such imperfections, in turn, imply that the supply of bank credit might be crucial for
aggregate spending decisions. If bank credit, in turn, is constrained by the supply of
banks’ reserves, manipulation of the supply of reserves by the central bank through
open market operations, discount borrowing, or changes in reserve requirements can
influence spending decisions through the “credit channel.”
B. Money and Credit in Industrial Countries
The empirical relevance of the credit view of the transmission has proven quite
limited in the context of the industrial countries (Romer and Romer [1990]). There
are at least two reasons for this result. In the United States, for example, firms can
bypass the banks by issuing commercial paper, bonds, and other direct liabilities that
are independent of the supply of bank credit. Even in countries where firms’ access to
alternative sources of credit is limited, the institutional setting in well-developed
markets is such that the supply of bank credit is unlikely to be constrained by the
supply of bank reserves. Bank credit might be quite special to many borrowers, so
that changes in the availability of bank credit—generated, for example, by changes in
regulatory policies or the capital base of commercial banks—might affect spending,
but the usual monetary policy tools do not directly constrain bank lending. 
Empirical tests reported below, for example, suggest that bank credit is an important
determinant of spending decisions in Japan. But this does not mean that monetary policy
is transmitted to the economy by changes in bank credit. The reason is that banks in
industrial countries have developed nondeposit sources of funds that are very close
substitutes for the liabilities of governments and nonfinancial firms. Moreover, as
documented by a recent study of reserve requirements in industrial countries by the Bank
of Japan (1995), authorities in industrial countries have reduced reserves against non-
monetary liabilities of banks in recent years, in most cases in an effort to maintain banks’
competitive positions in credit markets. It follows that the supply of bank credit is not
constrained by the supply of bank reserves. Hence, it is very unlikely that our analysis of
the effects of reserve requirements is important for Japan.
The institutional setting in industrial countries favors the “money is special” view.
Monetary liabilities of banks are likely to be constrained by the supply of bank
reserves, since reserve requirements on monetary liabilities are typically much higher
as compared to banks’ nonmonetary liabilities such as CDs and other nondeposit
liabilities. Moreover, at least in the United States, reserves are applied to the monetary
liabilities of nonbank financial intermediaries. The Federal Reserve, for example,
imposes reserve requirements on monetary liabilities regardless of the issuing institu-
tion. It follows that the supply of central bank reserves is closely related to the supply
of monetary liabilities. The supply of money, in turn, affects spending decisions
either through interest rates or more directly through wealth effects. 
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2. See Gertler (1988) for a review of this literature.C. Money versus Credit in Emerging Markets
The institutional arrangements that would make the credit view more likely to be
important are found in many emerging markets. Financial markets in such
economies are typically dominated by commercial banks. Moreover, financial repres-
sion in these banking markets is an important source of government revenue in many
cases. As shown in Drazen (1989), the key to this revenue is the imposition of reserve
requirements on all bank liabilities. This would normally encourage the growth of
nonbank financial intermediation, so a natural extension of this policy is to discour-
age development of domestic nonbank financial intermediaries and capital controls
that discourage nonbank borrowing in foreign markets. 
Firms may also find it difficult to borrow from offshore institutions because it is
difficult for the firm to offer lenders credible information about their financial
condition. Asymmetric information is a well-known problem that limits lenders’
ability to distinguish between good and bad credit risks. In most cases, disclosure 
of financial information is not mandated by law as a condition for access to equity 
or bond markets, traded equity is limited to a few of the largest firms, and
accounting standards are less commonly applied. This presumably makes the
information generated by a relationship with a domestic bank, which at least has
information about the firms and transactions by the firms’ owners, valuable and
difficult to replicate. 
In contrast to banks in industrial countries, nonmonetary liabilities of banks often
carry reserve requirements that are about the same as those on monetary deposits.
Moreover, in some cases even higher differential reserve requirements have been
imposed on increases in nonresident and resident deposits. These differential reserve
requirements are often a part of capital control programs designed to discourage capi-
tal inflows. As discussed below, these institutional arrangements fit the requirements
of the credit view quite closely. 
A key assumption that may not fit emerging markets in Latin America is the
ability of residents and nonresidents to avoid the repressed financial market. The
scale of capital flight from Latin American countries is strong evidence that attempts
to isolate and tax domestic financial markets have been circumvented by the private
sector. Moreover, as documented by Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1994) domestic
nonbank intermediation has grown rapidly in Latin American countries that have
maintained high reserve requirements, so that marginal deposit reserve ratios are
quite low. Statistics on capital flight suggest that foreign intermediation is less of a
problem in most Asian countries. While the growth of nonbank intermediation is
much more difficult to measure in countries where it is discouraged by the govern-
ment, it seems likely that this is also less of a problem in Asian developing countries.
Spiegel (1995) develops a model similar to that used in this paper, and argues that
reserve requirements have generated domestic nonbank intermediation in Korea and
other Asian developing countries. While we agree that the incentives are important
and will eventually undermine financial repression, our reading of the data is that 
this process is just beginning in several important emerging markets. In Korea, for
example, nonbank intermediaries have grown but are subject to the same reserve
requirements as the banks.
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A. The Financial Sector
The basic model is an adaptation of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Romer and
Romer (1990). We first consider a monetary sector in isolation in that the real and
nominal income are predetermined. The financial system is the simplest possible
with a banking system. The exchange rate is fixed. Banks hold three assets, reserves
(R), loans (L), and domestic government securities (B). Banks issue two liabilities,
domestic demand deposits (M)—henceforth “money”—that carry a legal reserve
requirement of (t) and nonmonetary deposits (D)—henceforth “deposits”—that
carry a legal reserve requirement of (t' ). Firms can only borrow in the form of bank
loans. They cannot issue bonds to other residents or to nonresidents. The absence of
a nonbank bond market reflects asymmetric information and regulatory constraints.
The central bank issues reserves for the banks (R), and its assets are domestic
government securities (B) and foreign reserve assets (R*). The relevant balance sheet
constraints are
R = tM + t'D (1)
L = (1 – t)M + (1 – t')D. (2)
We assume that the supply of loans is positively related to the loan interest rate, r,
and inversely related to the deposit rate, r.
The spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate is a function of the
marginal cost of funds to the banking system—that is, r/(1+t') if there are deposits
or r/(1+ t) if there are not,
3 and the marginal cost of obtaining information concern-
ing the quality of new loans offered by the private sector. The demand for loans is
inversely related to r and positively related to income (Y ).
4
In order to sharpen the distinction between the model and the standard model,
we assume that foreign bonds, domestic government bonds, and deposits are perfect
substitutes for both residents and nonresidents. Given the credibly fixed exchange
rate, this means that the domestic deposit rate is always equal to the foreign interest
rate. Residents’ demand for money is
M
d = M(r, Y ). (3)
The policy shock we are interested in is a change in the foreign interest rate.
Holding income constant, we can solve this system for the change in reserves as a
function of the change in the foreign interest rate as follows:
dR [t'(Lrrr. + Lr*) + (t – t')Mr*] — — = —————————— — — (4)
dr*                     (1 – t' )
where subscripts are partial derivatives.
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3. We assume that monetary deposits cost the bank r even if the nominal return paid to depositors is zero.
4. Note that we assume the interest sensitivity of loan demand to be zero or very small.Equation (4) implies that the change in the demand for bank reserves following a
change in the world interest rate depends on the structure of reserve requirements,
the response of the bank loan rate, the elasticity of the loan demand to the loan rate
and the bond rate, and the interest elasticity of money demand. We follow Romer
and Romer (1990) in assuming that the interest sensitivity of loan demand is small or
close to zero. Since firms cannot obtain other loan rates that might change with r,
they only care about r. We believe that this is a “reasonable” restriction.
These relationships are summarized in Figure 1. The CC curve is the locus of all
points for which the goods market is in equilibrium, given a certain amount of
reserves. The LM curve represents money market equilibrium. The BP schedule is
the locus of points for which the capital account exactly offsets the current account
so that the current account is in balance.
The horizontal BP schedule reflects the assumption that any current account
imbalance can be financed at the world rate of interest. A fall in the world interest
rate shifts BP down to BP1. Holding income at Y0, the LM curve must shift to LM1.
The slope of the LM curve determines the change in money demand and supply
consistent with the new world interest rate. The CC curve must also shift to CC1.
The slope of the CC curve determines the change in the demand and supply of
banks’ nonmonetary liabilities, and this in turn also changes the demand and supply
of reserves depending on the reserve requirement against nonmonetary liabilities. 
If the central bank were entirely passive, the increase in the demand for bank reserves
would be generated by unsterilized intervention in the form of purchases of interna-
tional reserve assets by the central bank.
Several special cases are immediately interesting. First, if time deposits do not
carry reserve requirements, or more generally if banks can issue bonds that are free of
reserve requirements, the model collapses to the traditional Mundell-Fleming model
in that the change in the demand for reserves depends entirely on the interest
elasticity of the demand for money and the reserve requirement on money balances.
In terms of Figure 1, a decline in the foreign interest rates generates a shift in the BP
curve; the supply of bank reserves must rise to match the increase in money demand
implied by the slope of the LM curve times the reserve requirement. The CC curve
must also shift down so that the equilibrium demand for bank loans rises, but this
does not alter the demand for reserves. 
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Y Y0Next, consider the interesting case in which the government attempts to “sterilize”
the domestic market for bank reserves by imposing a 100 percent marginal reserve
requirement against foreign deposits. In this case, the change in reserves is infinitely
large as (1 – t' ) Þ 0. This must be true because any change in money or loan
demand is not matched by a change in excess reserves. This clarifies the assumption
that bonds are perfect substitutes in the model. Sterilized intervention cannot alter
the equilibrium interest rate on the traded asset.
Finally, the case of greatest interest is that in which reserves on deposits are less
than 100 percent but equal to or greater than reserves on monetary liabilities.
Referring again to Figure 1, the shift in the LM curve does not increase the demand
for reserves, since the shift from interest-bearing deposits to monetary deposits
decreases the demand for reserves. The increased demand for reserves comes from the
shift in the CC curve—that is, the bank loan market. 
As can be seen from (4), the slope of the CC curve depends upon the reserve
requirement t', the elasticity of the loan rate to the deposit rate, and the elasticity 
of loan demand to the loan rate. For simplicity, we assume that loan demand is not
sensitive to the bond rate because borrowers cannot issue bonds. 
The difficult question is how the spread between the deposit rate and the loan
rate should be modeled. Romer and Romer (1990), for example, assume that the
spread decreases as r declines. This makes sense because the implicit tax imposed by a
noninterest-bearing reserve is increasing in r—that is, the tax per dollar of loan is
r/(1 – t' ). Thus, higher nominal interest rates imply a larger absolute spread, and
falling interest rates would be associated with a fall in the spread. It follows that 
the higher the reserve requirement, the greater the change in the loan rate in response 
to a change in the world interest rate. This means that high reserve requirements do
not help insulate the domestic economy from the transmission of shocks from inter-
national capital markets.
This conclusion might be tempered by changes in other determinants of the loan
deposit spread. For example, it could be argued that the spread increases when r*
falls because marginal increases in loan volume increase risk or monitoring costs. It is
plausible in repressed financial markets that banks have a set of existing relationships
with firms that provide the individual bank valuable inside information concerning
firms’ profitability. Expanding loans to existing customers increases the concentration
of risks to the bank’s capital inherent in its existing customer base. In developing
countries, diversification is often quite limited in that existing bank borrowers are
often concentrated in a few state-owned firms and one or two export industries. 
This argument for insulation assumes that the risk of default actually falls on
bank capital and this, in turn, assumes that bank capital is positive. In countries
where financial reform begins with banks with a negative net worth, this is not a
good assumption. In such cases, we would expect to see a relatively large response in
the supply of bank credit to a fall in international interest rates. 
The bank can also expand its lending base by seeking new customers, but in this
case the marginal loan rate must cover the fixed costs of identifying firms that are
similar in terms of risk and return to the set of existing borrowers. In either case, a rise
in the volume of bank credit is associated with an increase in the loan deposit spread.
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In this case, the bank is constrained from offering lower loan rates as deposit rates
fall, and so the supply of bank credit is not at all affected by changes in deposit rates.
Such administered interest rates are much more likely to be effective in emerging
markets where firms cannot go around the banks into the bond market. Moreover, if
there are only a few large banks, they might be quite content to exploit the monopoly
profits generated by the government’s price-fixing arrangement.
In summary, the tax effect associated with high reserve requirements would tend
to magnify the transmission of a change in the foreign interest rate to the domestic
bank loan rate. Other plausible stories about how lending rates respond to changes in
deposit rates suggest that lending rates and ultimately bank credit might respond very
little to changes in the cost of funds to the banks.
5
B. The Goods Market
We now consider the response of the system to a change in foreign interest rates
when income is free to adjust. It is clear that the elasticity of the CC curve with
respect to the world interest rate holding the loan rate constant is likely to be very
low in a repressed system. Given our assumption that domestic deposits and domes-
tic bonds are perfect substitutes for foreign bonds, “the” interest rate that appears in
Figure 1 can be thought of as the domestic deposit rate. Changes in this rate, other
things being equal, might affect savings decisions, but because of the offsetting
income and substitution effects the sign of the effect is ambiguous. 
If changes in the deposit rate are associated with changes in the loan rate, the CC
curve will shift in response to a fall in the international interest rate. We argued 
above that the loan rate might react slowly, partially, and perhaps not at all to changes
in the deposit rate. Thus, the shift in the CC curve depends on the loan supply
behavior of banks and the demand for loans by firms. 
Consider again the conventional Mundell-Fleming framework. In this model, the
response of the real economy is captured by the slope of the IS curve. As the world
interest rate falls, domestic investment rises and the demand for money rises because of
the increase in nominal GDP. Clearly, capital mobility means that the government
must increase the monetary base by a fraction of the increase in the demand for money.
Now consider the complete model with the credit market included. Again the fall
in the world interest rate shifts the BP curve down. But the CC curve shifts to the
right depending on the response of the loan rate. If there is an effect on the real
economy, it must come largely through a shift in the CC curve. If this shift is small
for the reasons discussed above, the transmission of the foreign shock to the real
sector is also small. 
The change in international reserves in response to a change in the foreign interest
rate is now
dR [t'(Lrrr.+  LYYrrr. )+(t – t')(Mr*+ MYYrrr.)] — — = ————————————————— —. (5)
dr* (1 – t' )
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5. However, some evidence for the “credit is special to investment” view has been found even for the United States
(Loungani and Rush [1995]).Capital controls in the form of reserve requirements on nonresident deposits have
two interesting effects. First, they imply that a larger private capital inflow and a
larger change in reserves is associated with a given disturbance in the foreign interest
rate. Second, they tend to increase, other things being equal, the change in the bank
lending rate and therefore the real effect of the foreign interest rate change. 
Why do countries employ reserve requirements that appear to be counterproduc-
tive in that they magnify changes in international reserves? So far, we have focused on
the effects of a given reserve regime as world interest rates change. But what is the
effect of a change in the differential reserve? Suppose, for example, that a fall in the
world interest rate and the resulting capital inflow induces the government to raise
the reserve requirement. The impact effect on the demand for loans is
dL — — = Lrrt' (6)
dt'
which is negative. Assuming thatt remains equal tot', the impact effect on reserves is 
dR (Lrrt') — — = ———. (7)
dt' (1 – t')
The immediate effect is to reduce the capital inflow and the gain in reserves. But
other things being equal, the cost of bank loans clearly rises. In effect, the domestic
borrower must pay the tax on the marginal foreign money. This has the effect of
discouraging the transmission of the real effects of the interest rate change. So
evidently a constant high reserve requirement has perverse effects. But an endogenous
reserve requirement policy that increases reserve ratios as world rates fall succeeds in
insulating the domestic loan market from the external shock. The “sterilization”
policy succeeds not because it discourages international capital mobility but because
it discourages domestic financial intermediation.
There is an interesting trade-off here. A higher t' means that a smaller shift in the
CC curve follows a change in the foreign interest rate. The analysis makes it very
clear that a high marginal reserve requirement against foreign deposits generates a
meaningless (as long as the fixed exchange rate regime lasts) private capital inflow
which is offset by a change in international reserves of the government. The high
reserve requirement also explains the often-mentioned, stylized fact that real loan
rates in the capital inflow countries are high. There have been a number of compet-
ing explanations of this, but this model suggests that financial repression can help
explain these high real rates. 
There are also the seeds of a banking system crisis in this model, although a full
exploration is beyond the objectives of this paper. The intuition is that the increasing
tax of the capital controls falls on domestic loan rates. In turn, if the banks and the
regulators are not careful only high-risk borrowers will accept these terms. The key
here is that we have set the stage so that capital controls work not through distorting
traded asset returns as is typical in the standard model, but instead through distorting
the cost of domestic financial intermediation. This distortion might limit the impact
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for banks is to survive with a negative net worth, the same policies could fuel a
speculative boom that more often than not will end in a bust. 
IV. Empirical Relevance of the Model
The conventional model suggests that capital controls are effective if they drive a
wedge between “the” international interest rate and “the” domestic interest rate.
Dooley and Isard (1980) document the use of reserve requirements and other con-
trols over capital inflows by Germany from 1970–74 and show that controls gener-
ated substantial covered interest rate differentials between onshore and offshore bank
deposits over this period. The ability of control programs to generate differences in
yields on short-term investments such as bank deposits or government securities
remains the standard test for the effectiveness of controls in insulating economies
from the effects of foreign interest rates. 
Similar tests for the emerging markets of interest in this paper suggest that their
domestic credit markets are highly integrated with international capital markets. The
evidence for this traditional measure of capital mobility or capital market integration
is presented in Chinn and Dooley (1995). Tables 1 and 2 reproduce these results.
Countries included in the sample for Table 1 are those for which data on forward
exchange rates are available. Since the existence of forward exchange markets is a
good indicator of the development of financial markets, it is not surprising that
covered interest parity holds in most cases quite closely. A recent exception is
Malaysia, where extensive controls over capital inflows allowed domestic interest rates
to remain well above covered returns on similar dollar assets for a few months. 
For countries without well-developed forward exchange markets, the presumption that
even short-term asset yields are equalized is less obvious. Haque and Montiel (1990)
develop an empirical test for developing countries for which market-clearing domestic
interest rate data are not available. This research utilizes an instrumental variable
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September 1982–April 1988 May 1988–November 1994
Mean Mean absolute Mean Mean absolute
Australia –0.20 0.88 0.27 0.29
Canada –0.01 0.16 0.10 0.22
Hong Kong 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.17
Japan2 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.05
Malaysia –1.41 1.51 –0.01 1.28
New Zealand –0.49 1.63 0.27 0.30
Singapore –0.47 0.49 –0.91 0.91
Table 1  Covered Interest Differentials1
Percentage points
Notes: 1. Figures in percentage points, estimated by regressing the end-of-month covered interest
differential on a constant. 
2. CD-Euroyen differential. Data up to September 1986 are gensaki rate. Estimate is from a
regression with a dummy for gensaki series, so that the differential is interpretable as that
pertaining to a CD rate.
Source: Chinn and Dooley (1995).approach to control for the endogeneity of the observed monetary base. The authors
conclude that the degree of capital mobility among developing countries is quite high, and
argue that this indicates that the pervasive controls over capital flows in place in most of
the countries studied provide little scope for an independent monetary policy. 
Dooley and Mathieson (1994) extend this model in order to test for changes in
the degree of capital mobility over time. They also find that capital is quite mobile
for countries that have extensive control programs and that, in most cases, this degree
of mobility has increased over time. In general, this line of research suggests that
control programs in developing countries have been of limited effectiveness. 
Other authors using similar techniques have reported mixed results. Reisen and
Yèches (1991) utilize curb market rates as a measure of effective domestic interest
rates and find that capital mobility remained roughly constant for a group of Asian
countries, while Faruqee (1992) finds that integration between developing countries
in Asia and Japan seems to have increased in recent years.
Each of the papers just discussed above attempts to measure a counterfactual
monetary base that the authorities are assumed to set for an extended time period.
However, the observed change in the domestic part of the monetary base is some
combination of the exogenous policy change and the response during the time period
studied to offsetting private capital flows. Since the response to a policy-induced
change in the monetary base can be literally instantaneous, it is difficult to identify
the policy-induced part of observed changes short of developing a complete model of
government behavior. It appears to be the case that different techniques for dealing
with the endogenous nature of the regressors have important consequences for the
results of these studies. 
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September 1982–April 1988 May 1988–November 1994
Mean Mean absolute Mean Mean absolute
Australia 5.40 5.47 4.20 4.20
Canada 1.16 1.27 2.57 2.57
Hong Kong –0.64 1.57 0.28 0.38
Indonesia 9.24 9.24 10.94 10.94
Japan2 –2.90 2.90 –1.17 1.80
Korea3 6.27 6.27 7.97 7.97
Malaysia –0.51 2.13 0.20 2.99
New Zealand 9.63 9.64 3.90 3.90
Philippines 10.47 10.47 11.08 11.08
Singapore –2.62 2.62 –2.02 2.02
Taiwan –2.64 2.69 1.04 2.74
Thailand4 2.05 2.51 2.85 3.01
Table 2  Interest Differentials1
Percentage points
Notes: 1. Figures in percentage points, obtained by regressing the local currency minus U.S.
Eurodollar interest differentials on a constant. 
2. CD-Euroyen differential. Data up to September 1986 are gensaki rate. Estimate is from a
regression with a dummy for gensaki series, so that the differential is interpretable as that
pertaining to a CD rate.
3. MSB until December 1991; call money thereafter. Estimate is from a regression with a dummy
for call money series, so that the differential is interpretable as that pertaining to an MSB rate.
4. Call money rate until December 1991; BIBOR thereafter. Estimate is from a regression with
a dummy for BIBOR series, so that the differential is interpretable as that pertaining to a call
money rate.
Source: Chinn and Dooley (1995).Our interpretation of the evidence is that domestic markets for short-term
financial assets in emerging markets are highly integrated with similar international
markets. Thus, it seems sensible to retain this assumption in attempting to
understand the effects of changes in international interest rates and other external
financial shocks.
The next important empirical issue is the degree of integration of domestic loan
markets in emerging economies with international loan markets. This empirical issue
is obscured by the fact that data on bank lending rates are difficult to interpret. Banks
may have several lending rates to different types of customers, and different banks
have different lending rates at a point in time. Thus, data on bank lending rates are
typically an average of a periodic survey of new or all outstanding loans. Moreover,
because the bank relationship is complicated and valuable to both sides, neither
banks nor their customers are anxious to reveal the actual terms of their lending
agreements. Certainly in cases where government regulations specify a loan rate struc-
ture, it would be very surprising to see anything but the legal requirements reported
to the central bank. 
Nevertheless, data reported in Chinn and Dooley (1995) and reproduced in
Figure 2 show that there are clear differences in the behavior of loan rates and of 
loan open market rate spreads. These data suggest to us that the transmission of
changes in money market rates to bank lending rates is much more obvious in the
industrial countries as compared to the emerging markets. It would appear that there
is at a minimum some scope for government policies designed to affect the loan
deposit spread. 
In order for the model proposed above to be relevant, two additional factors 
must be at work. The first is that the country must impose reserve requirements on 
a wide range of bank liabilities. Second, bank credit must have a measurable and
independent effect on spending decisions. 
None of the industrial countries is likely to meet these requirements. As docu-
mented by the Bank of Japan (1995), the industrial countries have turned away from
reserves on nontransaction accounts at banks in most cases because they injure the
competitive positions of banks relative to other financial intermediaries.
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n IndonesiaAs shown in Table 3, this trend toward lower reserve requirements is not evident
for the emerging economies. The table shows data for the ratio of bank reserves to
total deposit liabilities. Four countries—Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines—seem good candidates for our model in that average reserve require-
ments are quite high relative to the industrial countries. Moreover, as described in
Folkerts-Landau et al. (1995), Malaysia and Korea actively used reserve policies to
offset capital inflows after 1989.
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United States Japan Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand
1986 0.03147 0.01390 0.10164 0.09058 0.06134 0.10301 0.04020 0.04442
1987 0.02729 0.01312 0.10217 0.08865 0.06185 0.09802 0.03834 0.05401
1988 0.02555 0.01467 0.10585 0.10029 0.06275 0.09519 0.03993 0.04792
1989 0.02376 0.01288 0.09504 0.07893 0.08885 0.11852 0.03878 0.04325
1990 0.02506 0.01582 0.07502 0.04665 0.12106 0.10930 0.03837 0.03488
1991 0.02148 0.01377 0.08000 0.10260 0.12659 0.12790 0.04424 0.03701
1992 0.02125 0.01118 0.08668 0.11274 0.10732 0.13116 0.04358 0.02985
1993 0.02204 0.01124 0.08726 n.a. 0.09388 0.12856 0.04399 0.02984
Mean 0.02474 0.01332 0.09171 0.08864 0.09045 0.11396 0.04093 0.04015
Call money/BIBOR
IBLTI ITI
88 84 94 92 90 85 91 89
Minimum lending rate











88 84 94 92 90 85 91 89
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lending rate























n Korea n Taiwan
n Thailand
Note: Ratio of reserves to loans. 
n.a.: Not available
Source: International Financial Statistics.
Table 3  Average Bank Reserve RatiosThe final necessary linkage is between bank credit and aggregate spending.
6 Table 4
presents findings on the relationship between quarterly changes in imports and
lagged changes in bank credit, the real exchange rate, and income. For developing
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Country Sih i Sini k R
2 LM (4) N Sample
Australia –0.530 5 0.45 1.383 52 March 1981–February 1994 [0.224] [0.264]
Australia 0.711 4 0.53 1.336 53 February 1981–February 1994 [0.105] [0.277]
Canada –1.256** 4 0.72 0.254 53 February 1981–February 1994 [0.023] [0.905]
Canada 0.229 4 0.61 0.865 54 February 1981–March 1994 [0.585] [0.495]
Indonesia2 0.595 4 –0.12 0.302 49 February 1981–February 1993 [0.214] [0.874]
Indonesia2 0.998** 4 0.27 1.546 49 February 1981–February 1993 [0.027] [0.223]
Japan 3.667*** 4 0.19 1.973 51 February 1981–April 1993 [0.009] [0.123]
Japan 0.885 6 0.26 1.681 49 April 1981–April 1993 [0.462] [0.770]
Korea 0.727 4 0.57 1.740 53 February 1981–February 1994 [0.275] [0.165]
Korea 0.010 4 0.55 1.544 53 February 1981–February 1994 [0.964] [0.212]
Malaysia2,3,4 –1.506 5 0.11 0.242 46 March 1982–March 1994 [0.123] [0.912]
Malaysia2,3 1.554 5 0.12 0.188 46 March 1982–March 1994 [0.237] [0.247]
New Zealand –0.580 4 0.51 1.513 33 February 1986–February 1994 [0.178] [0.256]
New Zealand 0.142 4 0.53 1.236 33 February 1986–February 1994 [0.569] [0.343]
Philippines3 4.679** 5 0.94 1.310 20 February 1989–January 1994 [0.031] [0.859]
Philippines3 –0.655 5 –0.46 2.620 20 February 1989–January 1994 [0.878] [0.623]
Singapore2 –1.553 4 0.26 1.179 35 April 1985–January 1994 [0.120] [0.360]
Singapore2 1.921** 4 0.36 0.590 35 April 1985–January 1994 [0.017] [0.675]
Taiwan –0.788 4 0.34 1.185 37 February 1983–February 1992 [0.246] [0.353]
Taiwan 0.415 4 0.26 1.167 37 January 1984–February 1992 [0.453] [0.360]
Table 4  Response of Imports to Bank Credit or Money
1
Dimportst = h0 + åhiDbct–i + åbiDqt–i + ågiDyt–i +et
Dimportst = n0 + åniDm1t–i + åbiDqt–i + ågiDyt–i +et
Notes: 1. The dependent variable is log real imports; bc (m1) is log real bank credit (narrow money); q is the log real exchange
rate; y is log real GDP. See the Appendix for details. Coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. * (**) [***]
denotes significance at the 10 percent (5 percent) [1 percent] marginal significance level according to an F-test for 
the null that ∑ hi = 0 or ∑ ni = 0 [p-values in brackets]. k is the number of lags in the regression. LM F (4) is the 
F version of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation of order 4 [p-values in brackets].
2. All variables deflated using CPI.
3. Estimated using a filter of (1 – L) (1 – L
4).













6. Much of the evidence for an independent credit channel is derived from micro datasets. See the discussion in
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995) for the U.S. experience and Schianterelli (1995) for international evidence.
Unfortunately, such micro-based data are not available to us, and so we rely upon the time-series evidence.countries, we are particularly interested in imports as a category of spending because
high-quality quarterly data are available for a wide range of countries. Moreover,
imports are often found to be quite sensitive to investment and consumer durable
expenditures, which are most likely to be constrained by conditions in financial
markets. The sample periods usually span the 1980s and early 1990s, and the
selected samples are primarily dictated by data availability.
The regression estimates for Japan and the Philippines strongly support the 
view that bank credit is an important determinant of spending decisions, and that
money is not. The Korean data suggest that bank credit is important, although the
estimate is not significant at conventional levels. Results for Indonesia suggest that
money is more important than bank credit, although bank credit does have a positive
independent effect. 
Consistent with our expectations, the highly developed and liberalized domestic
financial markets seem to show little independent effect of changes in bank credit. In
our sample, these cases include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore.
Data for two important countries in our sample, Taiwan and Malaysia, are clearly
discouraging in that credit does not have the expected impact on spending decisions.
For these countries, we were forced to use total domestic credit rather than bank
credit as the right-hand side variable, and this may account for the results. 
As a final point, it is interesting to observe that the countries that exhibit sensi-
tivity to bank credit—Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines—have also managed
their reserve ratios quite actively, so that the reserve to loan ratio is highly variable.
V. Conclusion
The evidence presented above is far from conclusive. More careful modeling of 
the financial systems of these countries with the credit view of the transmission
mechanism is needed in order to understand the relationship between internal and
external shocks to the bank loan market. But there does seem to be a good case for
taking a careful look at the transmission of foreign shocks through the domestic
banking system in evaluating these countries’ relationships with one another and the
rest of the world. 
The traditional Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy remains the
dominant tool for understanding macroeconomic consequences of capital mobility
and capital flows for emerging markets. There is a good chance, however, that the
microeconomics of financial intermediation in repressed financial systems might also
yield important insights concerning the effects of international economic integration. 
In this paper, we modify a well-known closed economy model in order to study
the effects of market imperfections that make bank credit “special” and that might 
be very important for emerging markets. The model helps clarify the effects of
reserve requirements as a policy tool that has been used historically by industrial
countries and recently by developing countries to discourage capital flows. Results
that mimic some of the important economic regularities for emerging markets
emerge from the model. 
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on short-term, traded assets. Thus, in the traditional sense, this is a model of “perfect
capital mobility.”
Second, reserve requirements seem to be perverse in that a high level for reserves
nonresident deposits increases the sensitivity of private capital flows, domestic
investment, and consumption to a foreign monetary policy disturbance. A high level
of the reserve requirement also magnifies the change in international reserves
generated by a foreign monetary shock and the quasi-fiscal deficit associated with
sterilized intervention.
Third, although a high level of reserve requirements on bank deposits seems to 
be counterproductive, the model also implies that changes in the level of reserve
requirements can fully insulate the domestic economy from the foreign monetary
policy shock.
The intuitive basis for these results is that monetary policy affects spending
decisions through changes in the supply of bank credit. The assumption that bank
deposits are perfect substitutes across countries (when exchange risk is covered or the
exchange rate is credibly fixed) means that the differential reserve requirement on
deposits held by nonresidents is a tax that falls on bank lending rather than the
resident or nonresident holders of bank deposits. 
The underdeveloped nature of the domestic financial system and asymmetric
information implies that resident borrowers cannot avoid this tax by issuing
marketable bonds or dealing with foreign or nonbank domestic financial inter-
mediaries. For a given level of reserve requirements, a change in the foreign interest
rate generates a more than equivalent change in the bank lending rate. Thus, the
credit transmission mechanism is magnified by the capital control. But changes 
in the reserve requirement change the effective tax rate and can, in principle, be
manipulated to neutralize a foreign shock. 
Preliminary empirical work suggests that the model may well be useful in evaluat-
ing policy options in many developing countries that have maintained repressed
domestic financial systems.
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A. Interest Rates
1. Eurocurrency deposit rates
The U.S., U.K., and Japanese 3-month Eurocurrency deposit rates were the arith-
metic average of the bid and offer rates in London at close of market, as reported by
Bank of America up to October 6, 1986, and Reuters Information Service thereafter,
and recorded by DRI in the DRIFACS database.
2. Local market rates
Where the source is both WFM and DRI, then WFM is the source until October
1989, at which time DRIFACS is the source.
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Country Source DRI code Description Variable name
United States DRI FIP90Y Financial paper, industrial firms, 90 days IUS
United States DRI USD03 3-month Eurodollar rate IEUS
Australia WFM, DRI ADBBL90Q 90-day bank bill, quote IAU
Canada WFM, DRI CACP90B, A 3-month prime finance company paper ICN
Hong Kong WFM, DRI HKM03B, A 3-month interbank deposit rate IHK
Indonesia WFMr 1-month interbank deposit rate IIN
JAGBDS03 3-month gensaki bond rate IJP
Japan WFM, DRI JACD03B, A 3-month CD rate IJP2
IJP to September 1986, IJP2 thereafter IJP3
Japan DRI JAD03 3-month Euroyen rate IEJP
Korea WFMr 3-month investment and finance company bill IKO1 and corporate paper rate
Korea WFMr Monetary stabilization bond IKO2
Korea WFMr Overnight call money IKO4
Malaysia WFMr 3-month interbank deposit rate IMA
New Zealand WFM, WFMr 3-month commercial bills to December 1987,  INZ 90-day bank bills thereafter
Philippines WFMr from IFS 3-month T-bills at tender IPH
Singapore WFM, WFMr 3-month banker’s acceptances to August 1987; ISI 3-month commercial bills thereafter
Taiwan WFMr 90-day banker’s acceptances ITI
Thailand IFS, WFMr Call money rate to December 1991,  ITH2  BIBOR thereafter
Country Source Description Variable name
United States WFMr Prime rate, J.P. Morgan IBLUS
Australia WFMr (from Reserve Bank of Australia; Telerate) Major trading banks’ overdraft rate IBLAU
Canada WFMr (from Telerate) Chartered banks’ prime rate IBLCN
Hong Kong WFMr Prime lending rate IBLHK
Indonesia WFMr (IFS) Weighted average lending rate working  IBLIN capital of nonproprietary sector
Japan WFMr (from Bank of Japan) Short-term prime rate IBLJPS
Japan WFMr (from Bank of Japan) Long-term prime rate  IBLJPL
Korea WFMr (from Bank of Korea) Minimum lending rate charged to IBLKO general enterprises by deposit banks
Malaysia WFMr (from Bank Negara) Base lending rate IBLMA
New Zealand WFMr (from Reserve Bank of New Zealand) Overdraft rate to prime borrowers IBLNZ
Philippines WFMr (IFS) Average commercial lending rate IBLPH
Singapore WFMr (from Monetary Authority of Singapore) Major banks’ overdraft rate IBLSI
Taiwan WFMr (from Central Bank of China) Short-term lending rate, maximum IBLTI for up to one year
Thailand WFMr (from Bank of Thailand) Minimum loan rate (MLR) IBLTH
3. Local bank lending ratesB. Exchange Rates 
All exchange rates used to calculate covered interest differentials (except those indi-
cated below) are London 3:00 p.m., arithmetic average of bid and offer rates as
reported by Barclay’s until the end of March 1990, at which time the series is no
longer recorded by DRIFACS. Thereafter, the London close rate is used, as reported
by Reuters Information Service. A consistent series is not used (i.e., the London close
all the way) because these series only begin in 1986. The Taiwanese rate is provided
by Ramon Moreno at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco until December
1991, and by DRIFACS thereafter. 
Exchange rates used to convert import and export values in U.S. dollars to local
currency are period average (series rf) from International Financial Statistics (IFS)
(March 1995 CD-ROM). (The Thai rate is official.)
C. GDP and Investment
GDP: Australian, Canadian, Japanese, Korean, and Singapore data are real (1990
units) data from IFS line 99b (March 1995 CD-ROM). Taiwanese GDP data are in
1986 units, from Directorate-General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive
Yuan, Republic of China, Quarterly National Economic Trends, various issues.
Malaysian quarterly real GDP is estimated by running a regression of annual log-
GDP on quarterly log-industrial production (IFS line 66c); quarterly nominal GDP
is estimated similarly, using a regression on industrial production and CPI (IFS line
64). Indonesian and Thai quarterly nominal GDP is calculated as a centered moving
average of annual nominal GDP. Real GDP is obtained by deflating using the CPI.
Investment: Investment is nominal fixed investment deflated by (IFS line 93e)
deflated by the GDP deflator. Taiwanese data are from Central Bank of China,
Financial Statistics (Taiwan, Republic of China).
D. Money and Credit
Money: Narrow money, IFS line 34.
Bank credit: For most countries, IFS line 22d, except for Malaysia, IFS line 32d.
Taiwanese line 22d and 32d are indistinguishable. All series are deflated using the
GDP deflator, except for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, which use
the CPI.
E. Imports
Canadian, Japanese, Australian, Indonesian, New Zealand, Korean, Philippine, and
Thailand imports are IFS line 77abd (in U.S. dollars), at quarterly rate. Converted to
1990 domestic currency units using the GDP deflator and annualized, except for
Indonesia and Thailand, which are deflated using the CPI. 
Malaysian imports are line 71v (merchandise imports in millions of national
currency units, quarterly rates). Singapore imports are line 71d (merchandise 
imports in millions of U.S. dollars; converted to 1990 domestic currency units and
annualized). Deflated using the CPI.
101
Financial Repression and Capital MobilityBank of Japan, “Reserve Requirement Systems and Their Recent Reforms in Major Industrialized
Countries: A Comparative Perspective,” Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin, 3 (2), 1995, 
pp. 53–76.
Bernanke, Ben, and Alan Blinder, “Credit, Money and Aggregate Demand,” American Economic Review,
78 (2), 1988, pp. 435–439.
Chinn, Menzie D., and Jeffrey A. Frankel, “Financial Links around the Pacific Rim: 1982–1992,” in
Reuven Glick and Michael Hutchison, eds. Exchange Rate Policy and Interdependence:
Perspectives from the Pacific Basin, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press,
1994, pp. 17–47.
———, and Michael P. Dooley, “Asia-Pacific Capital Markets: Integration and Implications 
for Economic Activity,” NBER Working Paper, No. 5280, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1995.
Claassen, Emil, “Financial Opening and Monetary Control in Pacific Basin Developing Market
Economies: A Comment,” in Helmut Reisen and Bernhard Fischer, eds. Financial Opening:
Policy Issues and Experiences in Developing Countries, Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 1993, pp. 165–171.
Dooley, Michael P., and Peter Isard, “Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-
Rate Parity,” Journal of Political Economy, 88 (2), 1980, pp. 370–384.
———, Jeffrey Frankel, and Donald J. Mathieson, “International Capital Mobility: What Do Saving-
Investment Correlations Tell Us?” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 34 (3), 1987, 
pp. 503–530.
———, and Donald J. Mathieson, “Exchange Rate Policy, International Capital Mobility, and
Monetary Policy Instruments,” in Reuven Glick and Michael Hutchison, eds. Exchange Rate
Policy and Interdependence: Perspectives from the Pacific Basin, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 68–95.
Drazen, Allan, “Monetary Policy, Capital Controls and Seigniorage in an Open Economy,” in Marcello
de Cecco and Alberto Giovannini, eds. A European Central Bank?: Perspectives on Monetary
Unification after Ten Years of the EMS, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
pp. 13–32.
Faruqee, Hamid, “Dynamic Capital Mobility in Pacific Basin Developing Countries: Estimation and
Policy Implications,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 39 (3), 1992, pp. 706–717.
Folkerts-Landau, David, et al., International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Policy Issues,
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1995.
Frankel, Jeffrey A., “Sterilization of Money Inflows: Difficult (Calvo) or Easy (Reisen)?” paper presented
at Conference on Capital Inflows: Size, Nature and Policy Adaptions, Cartagena, Colombia,
July 29–30, 1994.
Fry, Maxwell, “Financial Opening and Monetary Control in Pacific Basin Developing Market
Economies,” in Helmut Reisen and Bernhard Fischer, eds. Financial Opening: Policy Issues and
Experiences in Developing Countries, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1993, pp. 143–164.
Gertler, Mark, “Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 20, 1988, pp. 559–588.
Gilchrist, Simon, and Egon Zakrajsek, “The Importance of Credit for Macroeconomic Activity:
Identification through Heterogeneity,” in Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, eds. Is Bank Lending
Important for the Transmission of Monetary Policy, Conference Series No. 39, Boston: Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1995, pp. 129–158.
Haque, Nadeem Ul, and Peter Montiel, “Capital Mobility in Developing Countries—Some Empirical
Tests,” IMF Working Paper No. WP/90/117, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, 1990. 
Loungani, Prakash, and Mark Rush, “The Effect of Changes in Reserve Requirements on Investment
and GNP,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27 (2), 1995, pp. 511–526.
102 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 1997
ReferencesReisen, Helmut, and Hélène Yèches, “Time-Varying Estimates on the Openness of the Capital Account
in Korea and Taiwan,” Journal of Development Economics, 41 (2), 1991, pp. 285–305.
Rojas-Suárez, Liliana, and Steven Weisbrod, “Financial Market Fragilities in Latin America: From
Banking Crisis Resolution to Current Policy Challenges,” IMF Working Paper No.WP/94/117,
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1994.
Romer, David, and Christina Romer, “New Evidence on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1990, pp. 149–198. 
Schianterelli, Fabio, “Financial Constraints and Investment: A Critical Review of Methodological Issues
and International Evidence,” in Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, eds. Is Bank Lending Important
for the Transmission of Monetary Policy, Conference Series No. 39, Boston: Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, 1995, pp. 177–214.
Spiegel, Mark, “Sterilization of Capital Inflows through the Banking Sector: Evidence from Asia,”
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, 1995, pp. 17–34. 
103
Financial Repression and Capital Mobility